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This article assesses the extent to which the impact of overeducation and
overskilling on labour market outcomes such as earnings and job satisfaction
relate to mismatches in particular competency areas. The analysis uses REFLEX
data, which collects information about 19 key competence areas related to job
performance. We find that the penalties to both forms of mismatch are
insensitive to the inclusion of controls for overskilling in a wide range of job-
specific competencies. The research suggests that the problem of mismatch
relates to an inability to fully utilise general or innate ability as opposed to
specific areas of acquired learning. We conclude that the problem of mismatch
can only be effectively addressed by raising general levels of job quality within
developed labour markets.
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1. Introduction
There now exists a substantial international literature examining the link between over-
education and labour market outcomes such as earnings, career mobility and job satis-
faction (see McGuinness 2006, for a review). However, overeducation represents a very
broad measure of mismatch and will be prone to inaccuracy in circumstances where (a)
job entry requirements represent a poor proxy for job skill content and (b) educational
attainment represents a poor proxy for accumulated human capital. Thus, the overedu-
cation measure will tend to be affected on the demand side by credentialism and grade
inflation and on the supply side by on-the-job training and unmeasured innate ability
(McGuinness and Wooden 2009). A more recent strand of the literature has focused
on overskilling as a measure of mismatch, as it asks respondents to compare actual
job content directly with their work-related skills (Allen, Badillo-Amador, and van
der Velden 2006; Green and Zhu 2010; Mavromaras, McGuinness, and Fok 2009;
McGuinness and Sloane 2011 AQ2). It is argued that overskilling overcomes many of the
perceived measurement problems associated with overeducation as respondents
directly compare all skills and abilities, whether they relate to formal/informal school-
ing or innate ability, with the actual skill requirements of their job. A further conceptual
advantage of the overskilling measure is that it is conceivable that we can separate
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overskilling into its various work-related components, in order to identify the degree to
which any observed wage or job satisfaction penalty relates to a specific area of skill
accumulation. However, to date, presumably mainly as a consequence of data con-
straints, no study has examined the correlation between aggregate measures of mis-
match and their individual components, and it is this gap in the literature that we
attempt to address in this paper.
The underlying rationale for our attempt to decompose the elements of mismatch
stems from the large body of evidence that has demonstrated lower earnings and job
satisfaction among mismatched workers (see Mavromaras et al. 2010; McGuinness
and Sloane 2011). Research has also demonstrated that mismatch tends to be non-tran-
sitory in nature AQ3(Mavromaras and McGuinness 2012; McGuinness and Wooden 2009)
and has negative implications for firm-level productivity (Tsung 1987). Thus, the evi-
dence suggests that mismatch will have negative consequences for macroeconomics
growth by constraining the performance levels of both individuals and firms. Conse-
quently, it is important to identify the areas where the costs of skill under-utilisation
are greatest in order to facilitate the formulation of an appropriate policy response
aimed at improving the quality of employment matches for workers and limiting the
costs to individuals, firms and the economy from mismatch. However, if it transpires
that the mismatch penalty is relatively poorly correlated with specific observable
skill attributes, then the obvious conclusion is that constraints relate primarily to
unused general or innate ability. Such a finding would support the view that overskilled
workers feel generally unchallenged within their work environments, suggesting that
the mismatch problem relates more heavily to a general poor quality of employment
as opposed to a poor match on specific acquired skills. The central aim of this paper
is to shed light on these issues and consider the implications for policy.
In terms of the evidence linking mismatch with lower job satisfaction and earnings,
the bulk of the literature has focused on the impacts of both overeducation and overskill-
ing on lowering pay (Mavromaras, McGuinness, and Wooden 2007; McGuinness 2006;
McGuinness and Wooden 2009); however, the impacts on job satisfaction have received
much less attention. While a number of studies have shown overeducated workers have
lower levels of job satisfaction (Battu, Belfield, and Sloane 1999; Fleming and Kler
2007), the situation becomes more complex when overskilling is brought into consider-
ation. For Britain, Green and Zhu (2010) find that overqualification is not a problem for
job satisfaction in itself if it is not accompanied by skill mismatch. Similarly, for Spain,
Badillo-Amador, Lopez Nicolas, and Vila Lladosa (2008) also find that skill mismatches
are a better predictor of job satisfaction than educational mismatches. McGuinness and
Sloane (2011), in their study of the UK Graduate labour market, found that overskilling
was associated with a lower pay penalty but a higher job satisfaction when compared with
overeducation. McGuinness and Sloane (2011) conclude that overeducated workers
may, at least to some extent, trade-off other job attributes, such as an improved work–
life balance, for lower wages thus explaining the reduced impact on job satisfaction.
The object of this paper is to examine the relationship between labour market mis-
matches, wages and job satisfaction across a range of countries. Clearly, if overskilling
can be attributed to mismatch in a specific competency areas, then potential policies that
encourage employers to develop and expand particular aspects of job requirements can
help alleviate some of the negative aspects of skills mismatch. Conversely, if we find that
overskilling relates to a general feeling of under-utilisation, then the policy remedy
becomes more complex as the result will imply that mismatch is primarily driven by a
general perception of an unchallenging work environment.
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2. Data
In this paper, we use the Flexible Professional in the Knowledge Society (REFLEX)
project financed as a Specific Targeted Research Project of the European Union’s
Sixth Framework Programme covering 15 countries.1 It is limited to graduates in the
1999/2000 academic year, who were interviewed five years later in 2005. The
REFLEX data contain information on 15 countries (we only consider the 13 European
countries within the data).2 It is limited to graduates in the 1999/2000 academic year,
who were interviewed five years later in 2005. The use of graduate cohort data is rela-
tively common within the mismatch literature (see e.g. Chevalier 2003; Dolton and
Vignoles 2000; McGuinness and Bennett 2007). Indeed, some authors argue that
such data are less prone to unobserved heterogeneity bias due to the fact that respon-
dents have uniform levels of education and labour market experience (e.g. Kelly,
O’Connell, and Smith 2010; McGuinness and Bennett 2007). For the purposes of
our study, we restrict our sample to those individuals currently employed (ignoring
self-employment, and unemployment) and who studied for their third-level qualifica-
tion on a full-time basis.
With respect to our key mismatch variables, in keeping with the approach adopted
by McGuinness and Sloane (2011), we include measures of both educational (overedu-
cation and undereducation) and skill mismatch (overskilling and underskilling), both of
which are measured subjectively within the data. As a result of our exclusions, the
effective sample falls from 34,347 to 16,810. Individual country samples range from
291 for Portugal to 3033 in the Czech Republic. Overeducation and undereducation
are defined strictly in terms of vertical mismatch, that is, having a level of education
above or below that required for their current job. Respondents were defined as over-
educated if they indicated that a below tertiary level of education was most appropriate
for the job. Conversely, they were deemed to be undereducated if the most appropriate
level of education was above that actually acquired. Overskilling was based on the
response to a question asking individuals to rate on a 1–5 scale3 the extent to which
their skills and knowledge were utilised in their work with a response of 1 or 2
deemed consistent with overskilling. Using the same scale, workers were deemed to
be underskilled if they responded 4 or 5 to a question indicating that their job demanded
more knowledge and skills than they could actually offer. Summary statistics for our
sample of countries are provided in Table 1. Overeducation rates ranged from 2% in
Belgium to 16% in Spain, while overskilling, at 14%, was found to be highest in
Spain, the UK and France and lowest in Portugal at 3% of the sample. It is important
to note that mismatch rates are based on a graduate’s only sample and, therefore, will
tend not to align exactly with other published studies based on population data. Never-
theless, the overall pattern of overeducation is consistent with previous estimates with
overeducation rates highest in countries such as Spain and Italy and lowest in Finland
and Belgium (Cedefop 2012).
A unique feature of the REFLEX is that, in addition to collecting information of
overall skill utilisation, it is also asked specific questions with respect to skill acqui-
sition and usage in 19 key competency areas related to job performance.
The competency fields are (1) knowledge (knowledge of own discipline), (2) other-
knowledge (knowledge of other disciplines), (3) thinking (analytical thinking), (4)
learning (ability to acquire new knowledge), (5) negotiate (ability to negotiate), (6)
pressure (ability to perform under pressure), (7) openmind (alertness to new opportu-
nities), (8) coordination (ability to coordinate activities), (9) effective (ability to use
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time effectively), (10) workgroup (ability to work productively with others), (11) influ-
ence (ability to mobilise the capabilities of others), (12) communication (ability to make
your meaning clear to others), (13) authority (ability to assert your authority), (14) com-
puters (ability to use computers and the internet), (15) creative (ability to come up with
new ideas and solutions), (16) flexible (willingness to question your own ideas and
others), (17) presentation (ability to present products and ideas), (18) write (ability to
write reports, etc.), and (19) foreignlanguage (ability to write and speak in a foreign
language). To derive a measure of overskilling in each area, we compared acquired
skills and their level of utilisation in the workplace. The survey asks respondents to
rate, on a five-point scale, both their level of expertise in a given competency and
the extent to which this competency is required for their current job. If the acquired
competency level is two points higher than the required job level, then individuals
were defined as overskilled4 in that specific field.
Table 1. Descriptive by countries.
No. observ. Mean No. observ. Mean
Italy Finland
Overeducated 1175 .129 Overeducated 1350 .057
Undereducated 1175 .122 Undereducated 1350 .109
Overskill 1175 .108 Overskill 1350 .062
Underskill 1175 .225 Underskill 1350 .263
Spain Norway
Overeducated 2269 .160 Overeducated 1522 .028
Undereducated 2269 .071 Undereducated 1522 .116
Overskill 2269 .143 Overskill 1522 .043
Underskill 2269 .238 Underskill 1522 .291
France Chez Republic
Overeducated 949 .044 Overeducated 3033 .030
Undereducated 949 .144 Undereducated 3033 .111
Overskill 949 .139 Overskill 3033 .093
Underskill 949 .154 Underskill 3033 .178
Austria Portugal
Overeducated 773 .106 Overeducated 291 .065
Undereducated 773 .084 Undereducated 291 .226
Overskill 773 .084 Overskill 291 .034
Underskill 773 .306 Underskill 291 .508
Germany Belgium
Overeducated 998 .047 Overeducated 908 .020
Undereducated 998 .063 Undereducated 908 .064
Overskill 998 .088 Overskill 908 .083
Underskill 998 .259 Underskill 908 .255
The Netherlands Estonia
Overeducated 2129 .070 Overeducated 401 .022
Undereducated 2129 .053 Undereducated 401 .184
Overskill 2129 .089 Overskill 401 .084
Underskill 2129 .252 Underskill 401 .331
UK
Overeducated 1078 .137
Undereducated 1078 .055
Overskill 1078 .140
Underskill 1078 .261
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It is somewhat difficult to distinguish clear patterns from 19 competencies distrib-
uted across 13 countries; however, it is probably fair to say that the individual compe-
tency overskilling rates appear relatively tightly distributed within countries. In terms of
cross-country comparisons, the evidence suggests that overskilling is generally higher
in terms of individual’s alertness to new opportunities and language skills with individ-
ual’s time management skills relatively well utilised. Given the central question posed
within the analysis, a key point of interest relates to the extent to which overskilling in
individual competency areas relates to our more general measures of overskilling and
overeducation. Furthermore, it is clear that many of the individual competency areas
will be highly correlated with each other and to explore these issues further we
present a skill correlation matrix in Table 2. The first thing to note is that, consistent
with the findings of previous research, the two central measures of mismatch are mod-
erately correlated with each other with a correlation coefficient of .38. What is much
more striking is that both overeducation and overskilling are relatively poorly corre-
lated with overskilling in specific skill areas. This suggests that either (a) the key com-
petency driving general mismatch has been omitted from our data or (b) the perception
of general under-utilisation relates more heavily to unused innate or general ability as
opposed to specific acquired skills. Given the comprehensive nature of the job compe-
tency information collected within the REFLEX data, we would argue that the latter
explanation is likely to be most reliable. In terms of the skill-specific overskilling vari-
ables, these all appear strongly related to each other with correlation coefficients gen-
erally in the order of .7. The possible exception to the rule is the variable ‘language
skills’ (the ability to write or read in a foreign language) with a lower correlation coeffi-
cient (.5) with respect to the other competency areas.
3. Econometric analysis
The approach adopted here centres around an attempt to quantify the proportion of the
overall earnings/job satisfaction overskilling/overeducation penalties that can be attrib-
uted to mismatch in individual skill competencies AQ4. In our models, we begin by estimat-
ing an ordinary least-square/ordered probit model in a basic specification including
only controls for mismatch in first and current employment before adding the skill mis-
match variables for current employment to allow an assessment of the sensitivity of the
general penalty to these effects. Our models are based on a pooled sample containing
controls for sector and country-level fixed effects.5 We did separate our data into groups
of countries6 to assess the extent to which differential pattern occurred; however, the
results were largely indistinguishable from those of the pooled sample.7
With respect to concerns related to both sample selection and unobserved hetero-
geneity bias, specifically with regard to the possibility that mismatched workers have
lower ability levels which accounts for lower wages, we assume these to be trivial
given the evidence from recent studies that demonstrate that the estimated impact of
overskilling on both wages and job satisfaction is unaffected by such factors (Mavro-
maras, McGuinness, and Fok 2009; McGuinness 2008). In fact, a recent study by
McGuinness and Sloane (2011) uses propensity score matching and a sensitivity test
for unobserved influences to demonstrate the robustness of the overskilling and over-
education measures used in this data set. Furthermore, McGuinness and Bennet
(2007), who use quantile regression models applied to a similar graduate cohort data
as a control for unobserved factors, find little evidence of significant variations
across the wage\human capital distribution pointing again to an absence of bias.
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However, this is not to say that the evidence on the impacts of unobserved heterogen-
eity is completely consistent. A number of studies have used panel data to show that the
estimated wage impacts of overeducation fell dramatically when estimated within a
fixed-effects panel framework (Bauer 2002; Mavromaras et al. 2010) with some com-
mentators citing the reduction as evidence of the importance of unobserved variables
that are not taken into account in most cross-section analysis, but can be included as
a fixed effect in panel data (Bauer 2002; Leuven and Ooosterbeek 2012). However,
more recent work has shown that where there is low variation in the dependent variable,
as is the case with overeducation, a good deal of the wage impact is absorbed into the
model fixed effect, implying that the impacts of unobserved ability bias may have been
overstated within the panel framework AQ5(Mavromaras et al. 2010). A more interesting
aspect of unobserved heterogeneity is related to unobserved personality traits. Blazquez
and Budrı́a (2012) AQ6report that entry rates into overeducation are associated with extra-
version, conscientiousness and an external locus of control. If such traits also impact
earnings and job satisfaction then it is possible that our results may be confounded
to an extent; however, while this is certainly an area for future research, accounting
for such impacts are beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 3 presents the results from the ordered probit model for job satisfaction. The
original survey information on satisfaction was collected on an ordered scale ranging
from 0 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied). The results in Table 3 are
expressed in terms of coefficients and marginal effects. In line with McGuinness and
Sloane (2011), we find that overskilling has the most significant impact on job satisfac-
tion with overskilled workers 18.2% less likely to be satisfied (JS ¼ 5) in the current
employment. Overeducation was found to lower the probability of job satisfaction
by 12.4%. Underskilled workers were found to have a slightly higher probability of
job satisfaction at 5.0%, while no effects were detected for undereducation.
Table 3. JS equation: marginal effects and ordered probit estimates.
Full sample Women Men
Male 2.063∗∗∗ (.018)
Labexp .001∗∗ (.000) .001 (.000) .001 (.001)
Overeducated 2.476∗∗∗ (.036) 2.502∗∗∗ (.046) 2.432∗∗∗ (.061)
Undereducated .030 (.029) .054 (.039) .007 (.044)
Overskill 2.768∗∗∗ (.031) 2.731∗∗∗ (.041) 2.822∗∗∗ (.048)
Underskill .158∗∗∗ (.019) .144∗∗∗ (.026) .174∗∗∗ (.030)
Marginal effects full sample
JS ¼ 1 JS ¼ 2 JS ¼ 3 JS ¼ 4 JS ¼ 5
Overeducated .027 .070 .083 2.056 2.124
Undereducated 2.001 2.003 2.006 .001 .009
Overskill .055 .121 .118 2.113 2.182
Underskill 2.005 2.018 2.031 .004 .050
Notes: No. of observations: 16,810. Between brackets stand error. All equations also include controls for
country-level fixed effects and other variables such as age, hours worked per week, number of employers
since graduation and dummy variables. Dummy variables are the field of study, if possessed a master’s
degree, if job matched to field of study or related to field of study, if have been unemployed since
graduation, if course was prestigious, if course was vocational, if employed in a research-intensive firm, if
employed in a public sector and dummy firm size AQ14. We also estimate robust variance by country and the
coefficients which measure skill mismatches continue being significant.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 10% level.
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The results from the wage equation are presented in Table 4. Again, these are con-
sistent with previous research (Green and McIntosh 2007; Mavromaras, McGuinness,
and Fok 2009) showing that the overeducation pay penalty is much more substantial
than that for overskilling. Overeducated workers were found to earn 29% less than
their well-matched counterparts, while overskilled workers earned 5.6% below than
that of workers reporting full skill utilisation. No wage impacts were found with
respect to undereducation or underskilling.
When we add the specific domains of overskilling to our model (Table 5), we detect
a variety of influences not all of which lower job satisfaction. While overskilling in the
areas of non-specialist knowledge, analytical ability (thinking), knowledge acquisition
(learning), alertness to opportunities (openmind), idea creation (creative) and language
skills all reduced job satisfaction, we found that surplus skills in time management and
the ability to work under pressure actually raised satisfaction levels. The result suggests
that surplus competencies in the ability to manage work requirements are viewed posi-
tively by workers. Crucially, the general overeducation and overskilling penalties
remained more or less unchanged when the additional controls were added, suggesting
that the general effects of overeducation and overskilling on job satisfaction cannot be
adequately attributed to under-utilised skills in any specific area. Furthermore, the mar-
ginal effects of the individual competencies are much lower than those of the general
mismatch variables.8 The results suggest that the widely observed penalties associated
with overeducation and overskilling relate more to a sense of unused general potential
as opposed to under-utilised specific skills, despite the fact that many of the competency
areas, such as analytical ability and idea creation, refer to under-utilised aspects of intel-
lectual capacity.
On the basis that observed patterns might vary by gender, we estimated our job sat-
isfaction separately for males and females. With respect to job satisfaction, our overrid-
ing conclusion that the previously observed effects of overeducation and overskilling
on job satisfaction were unrelated to under-utilisation in any specific skill area held.
Nevertheless, some impacts were significant with consistent patterns emerging in
that both males and females experienced lower levels of job satisfaction as a conse-
quence of overskilling in analytical thinking, the ability to acquire new knowledge,
the ability to question ideas, and creative and foreign language skills. Female job sat-
isfaction was reduced as a consequence of overskilling with respect to assert authority,
while surplus skills with regard to present products or ideas raised satisfaction. Male
levels of satisfaction were reduced (raised) as a consequence of overskilling in a
non-core field of study.
Table 4. Wage equation.
Full sample Women Men
Male .086∗∗∗ (.007)
Labexp .003∗∗∗ (.000) .002∗∗∗ (.000) .004∗∗∗ (.000)
Overeducated 2.290∗∗∗ (.015) 2.293∗∗∗ (.019) 2.270∗∗∗ (.024)
Undereducated 2.003 (.012) .016 (.016) 2.026 (.017)
Overskill 2.056∗∗∗ (.012) 2.063∗∗∗ (.017) 2.045∗∗∗ (.019)
Underskill .012 (.008) .009 (.010) .017 (.012)
Notes: No. of observations: 16,810. Between brackets stand error. All equations also include the same
controls as in Table 3. We also estimate robust variance by country and the coefficients which measure skill
mismatches continue being significant.
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When the controls for specific overskilling were introduced in the wage equation,
the general mismatch pay penalties again remained largely unchanged, confirming
the view that lower earnings among mismatched workers related more heavily to an
inability to use their general or innate ability as opposed to a lack of opportunities in
specific skill areas. The analysis suggests that overeducation and overskilling wage
penalties are primarily driven by low job quality that leads, in turn, to a general
under-utilisation of worker abilities. Table 6 also revealed that overskilling in the
areas of non-specialist knowledge and presentation skills resulted in modest wage pre-
miums, while an inability to fully utilise writing skills lowered earnings by 3%.
With regard to earnings, overskilling in particular competency areas has little
impact associated with any observed impacts specific to the female earnings distri-
bution (Table 6). Females overskilled in the areas of analytical thinking and report
writing incurred pay penalties of between 4% and 5%; nevertheless, the overall overs-
killing wage impact fell by less than one percentage point when the field-specific vari-
ables were included in the model.
Generally, our results align well with recent research highlighting the impact of mis-
match on job satisfaction and earnings. Mavromaras et al. (2010), using panel data for
Australia, find that overeducation and overskilling are distinct phenomena and have
separate impacts on earnings and job satisfaction. Mavromaras et al. (2010) report
Table 5. JS equation considering skill acquisition (probit coefficients).
Full sample Women Men
Male 2.055∗∗∗ (.018)
Labexp .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.001)
Overeducated 2.423∗∗∗ (.036) 2.45∗∗∗ (.046) 2.365∗∗∗ (.062)
Undereducated .023 (.029) .051 (.039) 2.003 (.045)
Overskill 2.716∗∗∗ (.031) 2.684∗∗∗ (.041) 2.763∗∗∗ (.049)
Underskill .143∗∗∗ (.019) .133∗∗∗ (.026) .151∗∗∗ (.030)
Knowledge 2.107∗∗∗ (.038) 2.125∗∗ (.050) 2.063 (.061)
Otherknowledge 2.049 (.033) .006 (.045) 2.107∗∗∗ (.050)
Thinking 2.103∗∗∗ (.037) 2.096∗∗ (.048) 2.109∗∗ (.058)
Learning 2.191∗∗∗ (.035) 2.154∗∗ (.046) 2.244∗∗∗ (.056)
Negotiate .018 (.035) .007 (.047) .025 (.054)
Pressure .274∗∗∗ (.042) .354∗∗∗ (.056) .159∗∗∗ (.066)
Openmind 2.074∗∗∗ (.033) 2.024 (.044) 2.145∗∗∗ (.052)
Coordination 2.103∗∗∗ (.039) 2.144∗∗∗ (.052) 2.060 (.060)
Effective .147∗∗∗ (.045) .144∗∗ (.058) .192∗∗∗ (.071)
Workgroup .013 (.038) .008 (.050) .017 (.059)
Influence .007 (.038) .017 (.051) 2.012 (.059)
Communication .086∗∗∗ (.042) .085 (.056) .093 (.066)
Authority 2.001 (.037) 2.088 (.049) .107∗∗ (.056)
Computers .125∗∗∗ (.033) .177∗∗∗ (.044) .050 (.050)
Creative 2.151∗∗∗ (.038) 2.200∗∗∗ (.050) 2.070 (.059)
Flexible 2.196∗∗∗ (.033) 2.180∗∗∗ (.043) 2.235∗∗∗ (.051)
Presentation .013 (.033) .042 (.043) 2.009 (.052)
Write 2.038 (.034) 2.049 (.043) 2.026 (.056)
Foreignlanguage 2.079∗∗∗ (.023) 2.072∗∗∗ (.030) 2.098∗∗∗ (.039)
Notes: No. of observations: 16,810. Between brackets stand error. All equations also include the same
controls as in Table 3. We also estimate robust variance by country and the coefficients which measure skill
mismatches continue being significant.
∗∗∗Significant at the 10% level.
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that, compared with overskilling, overeducation had a much larger relative impact on
pay but a lower influence on job satisfaction. Similar results were reported by McGuin-
ness and Sloane (2011) for the UK. Thus, the research is generally indicating that
workers are more adversely affected by overskilling, despite the fact that it is associated
with lower pay penalties relative to overeducation. These findings reinforce the con-
clusions that (a) overskilling represents a more accurate measure of skill mismatch
and (b) overeducated workers are likely, at least to some extent, to be compensated
for lower wages by other positive job attributes, thus leading to less pronounced
impacts on job satisfaction.
Finally, in an attempt to get a clearer picture of the key skill areas where workers’
under-utilisation is most pronounced, we next attempt to reduce the competency data to
a more meaningful level using principal components analysis (PCA). This method is a
way of identifying patterns in data and expressing the data in such a way as to highlight
their similarities and differences, since patterns in data of high dimensions, such as
ours, can be hard to find. It is potentially informative to present the data in a lower
dimension without any notable information loss.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the high correlations between the individual skill
components, the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) test has a value of just over .9,9
Table 6. Wage equation considering skill acquisition.
Full sample Women Male
Male .087∗∗∗ (.007)
Labexp .003∗∗∗ (.000) .000 (.000) .004∗∗∗ (.000)
Overeducated 2.283∗∗∗ (.015) 2.173∗∗∗ (.022) 2.268∗∗∗ (.025)
Undereducated 2.004 (.012) .022 (.017) 2.027 (.017)
Overskill 2.051∗∗∗ (.013) 2.252∗∗∗ (.019) 2.045∗∗∗ (.019)
Underskill .011 (.008) .056∗∗∗ (.011) .016 (.012)
Knowledge 2.001 (.016) 2.043∗∗ (.023) 2.013 (.024)
Otherknowledge .025∗∗ (.013) 2.019 (.020) .026 (.020)
Thinking 2.021 (.015) 2.039∗∗ (.022) .015 (.023)
Learning .003 (.014) 2.040∗∗ (.021) .008 (.022)
Negotiate 2.010 (.014) .003 (.021) 2.025 (.022)
Pressure .038∗∗∗ (.017) .076∗∗∗ (.022) .049∗ (.027 AQ15)
Openmind .004 (.013) 2.010 (.019) 2.015 (.020)
Coordination .007 (.016) 2.029 (.023) .0210 (.024)
Effective .015 (.018) .036 (.024) .024 (.028)
Workgroup 2.002 (.015) .005 (.022) .001 (.024)
Influence 2.006 (.016) .026 (.022) 2.038 (.024)
Communication 2.002 (.017) .030 (.024) 2.013 (.271)
Authority 2.027 (.015) 2.025 (.022) 2.021 (.022)
Computers 2.016 (.013) .065∗∗∗ (.018) 2.012 (.020)
Creative .005 (.015) 2.055∗∗∗ (.023) .011 (.024)
Flexible 2.019 (.013) 2.075∗∗∗ (.020) 2.021 (.020)
Presentation .004 (.013) .006 (.019) 2.009 (.021)
Write 2.030∗∗∗ (.014) 2.014 (.019) .004 (.023)
Foreignlanguage 2.014 (.009) 2.037∗∗∗ (.013) 2.019 (.015)
Notes: No. observations: 16,810. Between brackets stand error. All equations also include the same controls
as in Table 3. We also estimate robust variance by country and the coefficients which measure skill
mismatches continue being significant.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 10% level.
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indicating that the data are highly suited to such an approach. Within PCA, the vector
with the largest eigenvalue is called the first principal component and explains most of
the differences in our data, and the vector with the next largest eigenvalue is called the
second principal component, and so on. We retain the number of factors which explain
78% of the variance in the data, that is to say 4 factors. The determination of the number
of factors to extract should be guided by theory (Kaiser criterion), but also informed by
running the analysis to determine the number of factors that yield the most interpretable
results.10 Our selection of factors was, in this instance, determined on the basis of inter-
pretability, as opposed to their statistical properties, that allow for an assessment of the
impact of easily understandable competency areas on both job satisfaction and
earnings.
We perform a Varimax rotation11 AQ7in order to make the interpretation of the retained
factors easier.12 The first component gathers together under-utilisation in the areas of
pressure working, opportunity alertness, coordination, time management, productive
co-operation, mobilisation, expression and authority and can collectively be referred
to as elements of ‘work productivity’. The second component consists of overskilling
in the areas of computer use, problem-solving, questioning ideas, presentation and
writing and these can be collectively viewed as relating to ‘problem-solving and com-
munication’. The third component relates to under-utilisation in the areas of one’s own
specialist discipline, other disciplines, analytical thinking, knowledge acquisition and
negotiation which we term ‘acquired learning’. Finally, the fourth component relates
to ‘language skills’. Within the subsequent empirical analysis, we test the impact of
these collective components, alongside the individual competencies, on both job satis-
faction and earnings.
When the principal components are introduced into the regression, for job satis-
faction, we find that while overskilling in the areas of ‘problem-solving and com-
munication’, ‘knowledge acquisition’, ‘innovation’ and ‘language skills’ all reduce
job satisfaction, overskilling in areas related to job ‘productivity’ actually raises it
(see Table A1 in Appendix). This would suggest that job satisfaction is higher in cir-
cumstances where workers have surplus skills in areas considered core to their per-
formance, implying that workers prefer to have a skill buffer zone that allows them
to comfortably perform key tasks within their given job. With respect to wages
(Table A2) we obtained, a 1% pay penalty was observed for overskilling in the
areas of ‘innovation’. Again we observe that the introduction of the principal com-
ponent measures of overskilling do not result in any marked reduction in the
overall penalties to either overeducation or overskilling, reinforcing our view that dis-
advantage is not been driven by surplus skills in any specific area included within
our data.
4. Summary and conclusions
This paper utilised cross-country graduate cohort data from REFLEX to test the hypoth-
esis that the widely observed effects of both overeducation and overskilling on job sat-
isfaction and wages can be attributed to an under-utilisation in employment of specific
key work-related skills. We found that even after the inclusion of controls for skill
under-utilisation in 19 areas key to job performance, the observed effects of both over-
education and overskilling remain unchanged. These differences held when the analysis
was conducted separately by gender and were largely insensitive to re-organisation of
the data by country groupings. The work points to the conclusion that the observed
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impacts of both forms of mismatch relate to a general perception of under-utilised
innate or general ability rather than a constrained ability to make full use of specific
areas of acquired learning or skills. The implication of such a finding is that the
problem of mismatch cannot easily be addressed by focusing policy on improving
the job match of individuals possessing certain skill sets. The research suggests that
graduate mismatch can only be alleviated by increasing general levels of job quality
within economies. Finally, an interesting finding emanating from the analysis is that
surplus skills in areas related to job productivity performance actually raise levels of
job satisfaction by, presumably, providing workers with an operational comfort zone
within their given job.
An obvious question arising from our central conclusion relates to the extent to
which levels of mismatch are likely to persist or fall into the future. According to the-
ories of skill-biased technological change, future labour demand will continue to be
skewed towards more educated labour suggesting that the relative share of graduate-
level jobs will continue to rise into the future. However, levels of educational attain-
ment across developed economies are also expanding; thus, we might expect the inci-
dence of mismatch to fall only if the relative demand for skilled labour rises at a faster
rate than the supply of skilled workers. Cedefop estimate that the number of jobs
employing highly qualified people in Europe is due to increase by 16 million
between 2012 and 2010 (Scarpetta and Sonnet 2012), suggesting that we might
expect the incidence of overskilling to fall. Nevertheless, the situation remains uncer-
tain and the uneven distribution of high-level employment growth coupled with rising
educational supply is likely to ensure that the incidence of overskilling remains high in
many regions for some time to come.
Notes
1. The countries included in the analysis are Italy, Spain, France, Austria, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, UK, Finland, Norway, Chez Republic, Portugal, Belgium and Estonia.
2. There are also data for Japan which we exclude in order to focus on European countries.
3. Where 1 was not at all and 5 to a very high extent.
4. We tested the sensitivity of our analysis to variations of this definition and found that our
results remained largely unchanged.
5. The controls are not reported in the paper; however, detailed results are available from the
authors on request.
6. We check four country groupings: Central Europe countries: Austria, Germany, France, the
Netherlands and Belgium; East Europe countries: Check Republic and Estonia; Nordic
countries: Finland, Norway and UK; and finally Mediterranean countries: Portugal,
Spain and Italy.
7. Results available from the authors.
8. Results available on request.
9. A KMO of above 0.5 is generally considered desirable for PCA.
10. According to Kaiser’s rule only factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 is retained, but in
our case, this criterion is not useful because only 1 factor achieves this value. So, we try
retaining 3, 4, 5, and 6 factors and conclude that 4 factors are the most appropriate for
our analysis considering both the explained variance and the interpretable results.
11. Varimax rotation is the most popular rotation method. Formally Varimax searches for a
rotation of the original factors such that maximises the sum of the variances of the
squared loadings, all the coefficients will be either large or near zero, with few intermediate
values. This simplifies the interpretation because after a varimax rotation, each original
variable tends to be associated with one or a small number of factors.
12. Scoring coefficients could be available on request.
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Appendix
Table A1. JS equation considering skill acquisition using PCA (probit coefficients).
Full sample Women Men
Male 2.005∗∗∗ (.018)
Labexp .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Overeducated 2.427∗∗∗ (.036) 2.466∗∗∗ (.046) 2.355∗∗∗ (.062)
Undereducated .023 (.029) .047 (.039) 2.000 (.044)
Overskill 2.725∗∗∗ (.031) 2.700∗∗∗ (.041) 2.762∗∗∗ (.049)
Underskill .148∗∗∗ (.019) .138∗∗∗ (.026) .159∗∗∗ (.030)
Productivity .027∗∗∗ (.008) .019 (.011) .033∗∗∗ (.013)
Innovation 2.067∗∗∗ (.010) 2.063∗∗∗ (.013) 2.071∗∗∗ (.016)
Knowledge 2.049∗∗∗ (.011) 2.027∗∗ (.014) 2.079∗∗∗ (.017)
Languages 2.015 (.010) 2.009 (.013) 2.024 (.017)
Notes: No. observations: 16,810. Between brackets stand error. All equations also include the same controls
as in Table 3.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 10% level.
Table A2. Wage equation considering skill acquisition using PCA.
Full sample Female Male
Male .087∗∗∗ (.007)
Labexp .003∗∗∗ (.000) .002∗∗∗ (.000) .004∗∗∗ (.000)
Overeducated 2.284∗∗∗ (.015) 2.285∗∗∗ (.019) 2.268∗∗∗ (.025)
Undereducated 2.004 (.012) .014 (.016) 2.027 (.017)
Overskill 2.052∗∗∗ (.012) 2.056∗∗∗ (.017) 2.045∗∗∗ (.019)
Underskill .011 (.008) .008 (.010) .017 (.012)
Productivity .000 (.003) .006 (.004) 2.005 (.005)
Innovation 2.012∗∗∗ (.004) 2.015∗∗∗ (.005) 2.009 (.006)
Knowledge .004 (.004) 2.003 (.006) .015∗∗∗ (.006)
Languages 2.006 (.004) 2.005 (.005) 2.007 (.006)
Notes: No observations: 16,810. Between brackets stand error. All equations also include the same controls
as in Table 3.
∗∗∗Significant at the 10% level.
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